2 bases across the Japanese archipelago for their sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam. Most of the 400,000 tons of monthly supplies needed to sustain the US military in Vietnam also passed through the US bases stationed at Yokosuka, Sasebo and Naha (Havens 1987: 85-7) .
Many Japanese citizens saw their government's cooperation in allowing Japan to be used as a base for US war-making in Vietnam as unlawful and a violation of Japanese sovereignty. From mid-1967 From mid- to 1970 .7 million Japanese took to the streets to protest US bombing raids originating in Japan, seen as an unlawful contravention of Japan's 1947 postwar constitution (Havens 1987 : 133: de Bary, Gluck & Tiedemann 2005 : 1029 .
Moreover, Articles IV and VI of the 1960 Treaty of Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan explicitly stated that the Japanese government had to be consulted in advance if US troops based in Japan were to be mobilised for combat. Anti-war activists did not buy the fiction peddled by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party under Prime Minister Eisaku Satō that US troops received their combat orders once they were outside Japanese territory (Havens 1987: 12-3) . The streets become the theatre for the mass denunciation of the Japanese ruling elite and the means by which citizens thought they could reinstate democratic rule over a government that saw itself above the will of the people (Havens 1987; Marotti 2009 ).
The Vietnam War also proved a boon for the Japanese economy. Japanese firms were contracted to supply the munitions for the US war effort against enemies of South Vietnam along with a whole range of support services and everyday commodity goods for the US forces fighting in Vietnam (Avenell 2010: 143-4) . Between 1966 to 1971 an estimated one billion American dollars entered the Japanese economy per year as a result of the Vietnam war. Another indicator of how Japanese economic growth was chained to the Vietnam war was the fact that between 1965 to 1968 Japanese exports to Southeast Asia increased 18% 3 annually. By 1970, Japan had surpassed the United States as the leading trading power in Southeast Asia (Halliday & McCormack 1973: 54-6) . Prominent Beheiren activists produced a series of exposés uncovering a list of 'Hyena Corporations' feeding of American military involvement in Vietnam with fixed plans to heavily invest in South Vietnam's post-war economy. The most prominent names of corporate Japan made up the list: Mitsui Bussan, Mitsubishi Shōji, Marubeni, Toyota and Sony to name a few (Avenell 2010: 143-4) . To the anti-war activists, the support and participation of the Japanese government and industry in the Vietnam War and the rise to prominence of Japanese companies in Southeast Asia felt uncannily familiar. They took the Japanese businessmen who started to appear in the cities of Southeast Asia in the 1960s as representing the shock troops of Japan's new imperialism (Kaji 1973; Shimizu 1973) . The Imperial Army may no longer be marching through Asia, but it seemed that the actions of corporate Japan in the region were driven by the same will to dominate that drove Japanese overseas expansion in the first half of the twentieth century.
Beheiren led by the writer Oda Makoto and philosopher-historian Tsurumi Shunsuke were one of the first citizens' movements to use Japanese involvement in the Vietnam war to question the foundation of Japan's autonomy and affluence. Beheiren activists drew attention to the fact that every Japanese going about their daily life was complicit in supporting the US military in Vietnam. Oda and Tsurumi Yoshiyuki in particular claimed that under the Japan-US Security treaty, Japan was a client state of the United States. They pointed to the fact that the supply of special procurements for the Vietnam war by corporate Japan was a permanent and institutionalised feature of the Japanese economy and made possible the affluent daily life enjoyed by most Japanese (Avenell 2010: 143) . Beheiren spokespeople urged Japanese citizens to critically address their role in the historical circumstances that saw Japan once again perpetrating aggression against an Asian nation-this time by logistically supporting the US military in Vietnam. Some Beheiren activists called for an ethical awakening; a 4 cultural revolution in Japanese sensibilities and values that would enable each individual to see how their 'lives were completely bound to a culture born of a system forged' by state authorities (Avenell: 146) .
In Search of the Unreturned Soldiers in Malaysia, In Search of the Unreturned
Soldiers in Thailand, and Outlaw Matsu Returns are framed by the politics of the Beheiren movement in three distinct ways. First, the narrative of the documentaries subscribes to an anti-state agenda. The documentaries are organised around the idea that the workings of power are secret and hidden, concealed by the scenery of public appearances, and that the state and agents of political power are to be treated critically and with caution. In sum, the three documentaries challenge contemporary accounts that valorise the Japanese state as the ultimate political agent of progress.
Second, each of the three documentaries interrogates how the present reality of Japan's relations with its Asian neighbours is deformed by the ruse of memory and wrong reckonings by focusing on Japanese war responsibility and the unfinished history of the Pacific War: a war that is not a problem of yesterday but of today.
2 In the documentaries, Imamura investigates how the spectre of the war lies heavy on the present, not only for the Japanese people, but also for the peoples who inhabited the regions occupied by Japan that became the bloody battlefields of the Pacific War.
Third, following the cues of Beheiren activists Imamura incorporated a victimaggressor dynamic in his documentaries based on the critique that for Japan to find peace with their Asian neighbours, individual Japanese needed to resist the state locked into supporting the US war in Southeast Asia, otherwise they would remain victims of the state while simultaneously the victimizers of fellow Asians (Avenell 2010: 106-47) . In his documentaries, Imamura attempts to locate the origin of this victim-aggressor dynamic in the actualization of belief; the emotional investment and leaps of faith which infused and 5 affirmed the lived present with possibility and an agenda of action. Belief for Imamura was bound up with choices in a mode of existence, and a notion of self that could not be understood in isolation from its social and relational contexts. Politics and culture were inseparable. In the unreturned soldiers Imamura sought to find an untapped embodied experience of the Pacific War, a knowledge and memory that moved beyond the retelling of events. The documentaries begin with a simple supposition that challenges the dominate place-bound formation of Japanese identity, which chains culture, community and ethnicity to the delimited territory of the Japanese state. Namely, why did soldiers who sacrificed all for the Emperor chose to remain in Southeast Asia rather than return to Japan? In his quest to find what motivated unreturned soldiers to turn their back on Japan, Imamura hoped to unearth the beliefs that gave meaning and direction to their lives, and in the process have his audience actively relive an unalloyed experience of the Pacific War in order to understand the real life uncertainties confronting Japan in the present (Imamura 2001: 234-8 ).
Imamura and Documentary Style in Fiction Film
Japanese studios of the 1950s and 60s organised film production around the motto 'quick, cheap, and lucratively' (Tachibana 1988: 1-2). As a result, contracted directors had little say in the films the studio allocated them, which were a mixture of genre fare and star vehicles. The director's main role was to maintain production schedules, manage costs under budget, and to make popular films for a general audience. This was especially true for Nikkatsu film studios, which Imamura joined in 1954. Nikkatsu production was tailored around its stars, not its directors, and was renowned in the sixties for releasing low budget double features every week (Schilling 2007 (1963) was the first Japanese feature film to be entirely produced on location since the advent of the talkies (Imamura 2004: 40; Satō 1997: 70-3). Imamura had the actors fitted with wireless microphones and synchronized sound recording with filming (Imamura 2004: 118; Satō 1997:74) .
Imamura also broke studio procedure with his preference to work with nonprofessional actors rather than studio stars. He valued the 'raw' performances of untrained novices as a way of shredding the artifice of the actor. He valued the unconscious and accidental elements that penetrated the performance of untrained actors because it enabled subjective representations that exceed expectation to be captured by the camera (Imamura 2004 : 100).
Imamura's experimental and documentary style fiction film making was ill-suited to the high-volume low-budget production regime of Nikkatsu studios, however. For example,
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Imamura always insisted on conducting intensive, time consuming background research. He placed great value in understanding the time, place, cultural context, and beliefs (point of view) before he began writing scripts for his films. He saw background research as providing the raw material from which to build narrative arc and character development that would give his films their singularity and keep the audience engaged (Sato 2012: 3) . Moreover, he preferred to work by rehearsing each scene extensively, and would use substantial amount of film by shooting multiple takes. This way of shooting went against the frugality demanded by the studio, where production costs were calculated to be about one-third of all film related expenses. Imamura was renowned within the upper echelons of Nikkatsu for not working to budget. In fact, as punishment for wilfully exceeding production costs for his 1961 feature
Pigs and Battleships, the studio prohibited Imamura from directing another feature film for two years. He expanded on this topic in a conversation with Audie Bock. Imamura noted that in order to understand the whole of the contemporary Japanese life, one needed to notice the roof-top shrines or household altars (kamidana) dedicated to the local tutelary deities that sit on top of all the high-rise buildings of large Japanese conglomerates and the smaller factories that pock the landscape of urban Japan. For him, it was these 'little shrines' that embody the belief that pervade 'the Japanese consciousness under the veneer of business suits and advanced technology.' Custom, practice and faith assured the mighty Japanese conglomerates and imbued them with the confidence to invest resources and manpower in business ventures (Bock 1978: 287) .
The eighteen-month protracted shooting schedule however did not sit was well with others and gave rise to frustration and conflict amongst Imamura and his cast and crew.
While Imamura was happy to spend his days talking with the local inhabitants, the actors reportedly had little interest in using the delay in production to explore the culture and values of the local inhabitants in order to give authenticity to their performance. This indifference frustrated Imamura immensely who wanted his actors to go beyond affectation and surface expression and seek the subconscious, unseen forces that motivate action. Imamura put down the actors' indifference as a product of their vocation. The primary concern of an actor was their screen presence. Success lay in pleasing an audience and not on any criteria of authenticity. As a result, Imamura came to the conclusion that he no longer wanted to work with actors as they were nihilistically fixated on the surface expressions of their performance and the superficiality of their public persona with little interest in the world 'as it was' (Imamura 2001: 236) .
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Embittered by the commercial failure of The Profound Desire of the Gods and his experience with actors during shooting on location in Okinawa, Imamura retreated to documentary film-making and his aesthetic quest to go beyond representation and create an ordered unity of the world by cutting up and arranging images that would make visible the connectedness between the inner mental state of the protagonist and the world they inhabited.
For nine years he devoted himself to finding a cinema that would dissolve the binary between objective and subjective truth; between fact and fiction.
In Search of the Unreturned Soldiers
The two companion-piece documentaries (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) promised to bring high growth and material prosperity to all Japanese, thus metamorphosing Japanese conservatives from prewar collaborators to benign liberals. Ikeda's political alchemy was backed up by social welfare programs and the development of a domestic consumer economy, which transformed most Japanese into the middle class whilst simultaneously reinforcing a national narrative 10 that erased Japanese responsibility and guilt for a fifteen-year war waged on the rest of Asia (Igarashi 1998 
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The documentary exhumes a series of discomforting facts about the war for its intended Japanese audience. In his investigations, Imamura uncovers that some of the fiercest resistance to the Japanese invasion in February, 1942, was by the 1,500 Chinese communist political prisoners, released by the British authorities in the final days before the fall of Singapore, who fought the invading Japanese army to the last man. This is a jarring revelation if juxtaposed with the facts presented in standard textbooks which inform that General Arthur Percival, the British commander in Singapore, arranged for the surrender of 100,000 Commonwealth troops, or the factual digression found in the footnotes of accounts covering the fall of Singapore that chronicle the commander of the Australian forces, Lieutenant General Henry Bennet, escaping under cover of darkness whilst instructing the 15,000 men under his command to remain at their post.
Imamura's odyssey to find unreturned soldiers also exposed the changes of Japanese character and temperament before and after post-war economic growth. Japanese who had For a Japanese TV audience born after the war, this would be a shocking revelation as the details of such events were suppressed from the public narrative of the Pacific War.
14 Imamura's odyssey ends with the discovery of Akeem, a former Japanese soldier wholly integrated into a close-knit Muslim community. Akeem provided Imamura with the voice he has been searching to critique the 'false progress' and 'empty democracy' of post-war Japan committed to a model of modern sameness (Imamura 2004: 158-9) . Akeem tells the camera that he feels pity for the 'disadvantaged people' of Japan who work long, hard hours for shallow economic success. According to Akeem, the Japanese had developed economically faster than the 'materially poor Malays' not because they were superior, but because they lacked any moral bearings. Economic success came easily to the Japanese because Japanese domination (Dower 1986: 203-90) . The term 'Greater East Asia' implied that in addition to Japan, Manchukuo, and China, regional 'co-prosperity' would include Southeast Asia.
Cloaked in the language of "liberation," the new policy to expand the boundaries of Japan's empire beyond East Asia was an attempt by the Japanese leaders to seize the opportunity Nakayama Namio, now a wealthy doctor, refuses to talk about the war or criticise the Emperor/Living Sun God. 6 Yet the trauma of the war was inscribed directly upon his body.
Tattooed on his back were a series of Buddhist-related blessings and protective spells. Fujita excellence -Japanese who loyally served the Emperor and pre-war Japanese state only to be disavowed when they are no longer of use.
"moment" of post-war Japan, bringing the audience into contact with a whole new unconscious optics that would reveal the true situation of the present, and in the process, leading the audience away from their zone of passive entertainment to a space of critical enjoyment.
*In memory of Peter Williams (1953 Williams ( -2015 .
I would like to thank John Whalen-Bridge for his assistance and the two anonymous reviewers for their feedback in the writing of this article. with the invasion of Manchuria.
3 Imamura fared better than the producer who was sacked.
4 These events are remembered as the Malayan Emergency (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) 5 The Japanese are estimated to have killed between 6,000 to 40,000 Chinese civilians in the Sook Ching Massacre carried out in the first month of the occupation.
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6 The Japanese Emperor is believed to be the direct descendent of the celestial sun-goddess Amaterasu-ōmikami (Great Divinity Illuminating Heaven).
7 Ibaraki prefecture is located to the northeast of Tokyo along the Pacific coast. Once farm land, many of the major cities of Ibaraki prefecture are now part of the Greater Tokyo Area.
8 The term kimin is usually associated with Japanese immigrants who were mostly neglected by the Japanese government and left to fend for themselves. Here Imamura seems to have appropriated this term and adapted it to connote people callously discarded once they no longer had a role to play in the Japanese government's ambitions to become a leading developed nation. Imamura's other documentary dealing with kimin is Karayuki-san, The
Making of a Prostitute (1975) , where he discovers that Kikuyo Zendō, a former karayuki-san, chose not to return to Japan because of the prejudice she faced coming from a discriminated community (tokushu burakumin). For more elaboration on the relationship between overseas Japanese prostitution and discriminated communities see Oharazeki (2016) . 
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